Buddhika
Piyasena & Alastair Corera,
Fitch Ratings Lanka Limited
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The
commercial banking sector accounts
for a large portion of the total
assets in the Sri Lankan financial
system. The local capital markets
are underdeveloped and have not
resulted in substantial financial
disintermediation, and hence have
not posed serious competition to
the banking sector. Since disintermediation
is low, banks maintain reasonably
healthy spreads, and in general
have reported healthy profits.
However,
as competition intensifies, there
is greater pressure on management
to deliver adequate returns to shareholders.
Management has to regularly scrutinise
ongoing operations to ensure that
the assets of the banks are being
deployed in the most optimum manner.
In this context, proper pricing
of loans and other products takes
on a crucial role, and this article
discusses a framework for pricing
of loans.
For
banks, clearly defining and measuring
the link between risk and pricing
is the most critical factor. Risk
adjusted pricing and risk adjusted
performance measurement are considered
increasingly important, driven by
regulatory pressures and far-sighted
shareholder expectations. However,
competitive pressures and volume
driven mentality have meant that
pricing of advances, particularly
corporate loans are often under
priced. At the same time banks maybe
foregoing attractive customer segments
due to poor understanding of the
risks or badly designed pricing
frameworks. Inadequate data and
management information have prevented
a proper assessment of historical
management decisions and misguides
strategic plans.
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Risks
faced by banks can be broadly categorized
as Credit, Market, Liquidity and
Operational risks. Credit risk stands
out as the most important of these
categories, even though it has received
far less attention than required.
An integral function of controlling
and minimizing credit risks is the
proper pricing of loans, and in
this context banks would do well
to improve current systems.
To
appropriately price loans, a bank
must understand the various ‘cost’
components. These could be broadly
identified as cost of borrowing,
overheads, and credit costs (i.e
losses incurred due to bad loans)
and return required by shareholders.
Current systems in use in Sri Lanka,
(excluding a few banks which have
implemented risk adjusted pricing
or return on equity based pricing
frameworks) generally capture cost
of borrowings and cost of administration
and overheads, but are poor at factoring
in credit costs.
Credit
costs or losses due to bad loans
could be viewed as a function of
the borrower’s probability
of default, and an estimate of the
loss experience in the event of
default. (i.e. the net loss that
would be incurred by the bank after
realization of collateral). These
are obviously estimates that have
to be made at the time of granting
the loan, and therefore could be
viewed as ‘expected losses’.
The actual loss incurred by the
bank on its portfolio of loans could
be higher or lower; i.e ‘the
unexpected loss’. Unexpected
losses will be written off against
profits when it is actually incurred.
A well designed pricing system will
strive to minimize unexpected losses,
thereby ensuring that the original
profit estimates are achieved. This
is easier said than done, and requires
a comprehensive framework with adequate
support systems. Usually the framework
would comprise of a sound internal
rating system supported by competent
analytical staff and tools to analyse
historical data and continuously
refine assumptions.
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One
example of a pricing model which
incorporates the key components
discussed would be as follows.
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Required ROE -
15%
(15% @ on capital of 10/-)
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1.5 |
Assuming that management has
targeted an ROE of 15%. |
| Overheads and administrative
cost |
6.0 |
Total overheads as a % of
average loans was 6.8% in 2003.
Ideally banks should use a forward
looking number, as opposed to
a historic number. For example
budgeted overheads as % of budgeted
average loans. For an inefficient
bank, the use of historical
numbers will result in the pricing
model suggesting a higher spread.
Could result in foregoing good
opportunities, due to historical
inefficiencies. |
| Credit Cost |
1.0 |
This is based on the assumption
that the annual incidence of
NPLs is approximately 2% of
average loans. Loss experience
is estimated at 50%. i.e 50%
of NPLs are recovered by realizing
collateral or other means. (Ideally,
this must be based on the credit
cost arrived through the internal
rating framework) |
| 1+2+3 |
8.5 |
Minimum margin required to
cover overheads, credit costs
and ROE requirements. |
Cost of funds.
(8%on borrowings of 90/-)
|
7.2 |
Should be higher of risk free
rate or banks cost of borrowing.
|
| Less: Anticipated fee income
from loan relationship. |
(3.0) |
Bank could price loans cheaply,
on the basis that the account
would generate healthy commission
income. |
| Minimum lending rate. |
12.7 |
To be used as a guidance.
There are likely to be exceptions,
but exceptions should be granted
only for valid reasons. |
The
model by itself is fairly simple.
Its success however lies in the
implementation. Ideally this exercise
should be carried out for each customer
segment since cost components could
vary widely, especially credit costs.
For instance, the probability of
default and loss experience for
top quality corporates would usually
be very low. On the other hand,
credit card loans would have a high
probability of default and a high
loss experience, as there is no
collateral. Hence credit cost would
be very high. Nonetheless, given
the high rates earned, the product
is still profitable.
The
objective of the pricing model is
to minimize adverse selection and
ensure that loans are priced adequately.
For instance, referring to the above
example, although loans to the top
corporates may have negligible credit
costs, the loan may still not provide
the bank an adequate return on equity,
as margins to this segment are typically
very thin. If appropriately informed,
management could then decide to
move away from such loans and deploy
resources to more profitable segments.
The use of such a model helps in
instilling discipline across all
lending units to ensure that products
are not mis-priced. Typically the
model would act as guidance. It
is very likely that the bank would
make exceptions, but these should
be for valid reasons and approved
by a credit controller or an apex
credit committee. Under-pricing
merely to overcome competition will
eventually result in banks eroding
their capital base.
Those
involved in establishing pricing
policy would have to consider each
of the components mentioned above
and set hurdle rates for each customer
segment. While we have commented
on some of the aspects alongside
the respective cost items in the
table above, we have discussed in
greater detail the measurement of
credit costs and the inputs and
system support required to arrive
at assumptions for credit costs.
The
accurate assessment of credit cost
requires a fairly modern credit
risk assessment and management system.
Poor credit risk management is by
far the most serious problem faced
by domestic banks. This is aggravated
by the fact that the legal environment
in the country is not creditor friendly.
It is imperative therefore that
sound credit evaluation and sanctioning
procedures, which reflect ground
realities are implemented.
What
does it take to implement a good
credit risk assessment and management
system? Information is at the very
heart of the answer. For pricing
purposes, the information systems
should be designed to track credit
costs for the various product segments.
The current management information
systems of most banks rarely track
this, losing crucial information
required for pricing of new loans.
The lending institutions can also
look up to external databases such
as credit bureaus to further enhance
their information store. Key attributes
of a risk management system that
would assist management in assessing
proper credit costs would include
the following.
The
expected losses or expected credit
costs is a function two aspects;
i.e. The probability of default
and loss in the event of default.
(as shown in the diagram below).
Estimating probability of default
and loss given default, requires
both qualitative and quantitative
analysis along with expert judgement.
Despite the subjective elements
involved, through regular use banks
would be able to refine the process
to a fair level of accuracy to estimate
credit cost for any particular/or
pool of facilities.
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Based
on Rating from the Internal
Rating System |
Value
of Facility, Seniority, Maturity,
Collateral
Guarantees and expert judgement
based on pervious experiences
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Estimating probability of default
for a loan or a product segment
is usually carried out through the
use of internal credit rating systems.
Typically an internal rating system
factors in a series of both quantitative
(revenue, cash flows, leverage etc)
and qualitative (quality of management,
market position, industry features)
factors. These factors would be
assigned specific weights or points,
which collectively determines the
ultimate rating. An estimate of
probability of default of a particular
borrower is arrived at, by studying
the default history within that
rating category. While some banks
in Sri Lanka have drawn up internal
rating scales and assign ratings
to borrowers, they do not carry
out the vital function of studying
historical data to understand default
patterns. Hence, validating the
rating scale is not possible. Furthermore,
such internal ratings offer very
limited utility to the loan pricing
function, except for very broadly
categorizing borrowers. It is only
through the constant analysis of
historic data could the scale be
refined to produce accurate estimates
of probability of default.
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In
assigning ratings, the judgment
of rating staff plays a critical
role. Hence, in designing the rating
systems and processes, steps should
be taken to ensure accuracy and
consistency without over restricting
the exercise of judgment. A key
operating design is the division
of responsibility for grading; i.e
the recommended practice is for
the bank to maintain a separate
risk grading unit, separate from
the relationship managers or the
individuals initiating the credit
so that independence and consistency
is maintained. Other key features
should include; a review of ratings
to detect errors, placing of ultimate
authority over grade assignments,
formality of the process and specificity
of formal rating definitions.
Based
on the above, it is clear that data
plays a pivotal role in implementing
a sound internal rating system.
Data collection must cover a reasonable
period in order to properly assess
loss related probabilities. External
data adequately validated could
be used in the absence of a proper
internal data base or coupled with
internal data to further enhance
the database.
The other component of estimating
expected loss is the assessment
of loss experience given default.
While the quality of the collateral
would obviously play a crucial role
in this, we would like to focus
on an aspect that appears to have
been somewhat neglected by quite
a few of the local banks, i.e. the
banks NPL work out procedures and
the effectiveness of the work out
unit which could contribute significantly
in reducing the loss experience.
With accumulated non-performing
loans accounting for broadly 162%
of the aggregate equity of the banking
system, the recoveries division
of a bank should play a critical
role in preserving or enhancing
shareholders wealth.
Often
banks retain collateral for a substantial
period of time with the hope of
realizing higher disposal value,
but neglect aspects such as cost
of carry and time value, ultimately
realizing less value in economic
terms. By ensuring that disposal
and realisation of collateral is
carried out on a more frequent basis,
the management would ensure that
valuation of collateral is more
realistic. While this approach is
likely to result in experiencing
higher losses compared to what is
presently experienced, it will focus
the senior management’s attention
once more to the loan approval process.
After all the activity that drives
NPLs is the granting of loans, and
therefore continuous refinements
should be made to the approval process
with a view to containing NPLs.
The regular realization of collateral
would also ensure that assumptions
made regarding loss experience are
realistic and reflect current market
conditions.
The
loss experience of a bank could
also be improved by strengthening
the recovery units. Dealing with
problem loans requires a relatively
high level of experience and skills.
In practice however, the resources
made available to such units appear
inadequate. In fact, in the past
there have been instances where
the units were regarded as a “punishment
centre”. Given that the unit
is responsible for a fairly significant
portion of the banks assets, the
NPL recovery unit must be treated
as a specialist function that is
provided with adequate resources
and supported by other functions
of the bank, especially loan approval
and monitoring. Staff must possess
strong negotiation skills that are
important in re-structuring of credit
facilities and for realizing optimal
value during disposal of collateral.
In some sense the skill requirement
of this unit are similar to investment
banking, and therefore the best
resources should be employed.
Credit bureaus which emerged to
share bad experience with other
borrowers play a critical role in
today's credit markets. The credit
history information and other additional
services such as credit scores and
alerts provided by credit bureaus
facilitate lenders to assess and
monitor the risk of lending, and
hence make more informed and profitable
business decisions. More importantly,
credit bureaus are a valuable source
of data to assist banks in segmenting
the market and identify new profitable
opportunities. If used properly,
this data, which is a lot more comprehensive
than the bank’s customer information
could provide valuable inputs for
the bank’s pricing model.
Successful credit bureaus are dependent
on both legislative and proper infrastructure
support. While on the legislative
side, the bureaus must provide adequate
protection for lenders, data collected
and data subjects, the legal system
must also facilitate full-file data
sharing. The bureaus must also possess
sound data sharing and communication
infrastructure along with proper
delivery mechanisms. Data collection
and provision of information is
not necessarily restricted to lenders,
but can extend to other industries
such as insurance or the utility
providers.
In most emerging economies, credit
bureaus share only negative information
such as late payments and defaults,
due to regulatory reasons and/ or
not appreciating the value of positive
information. Proper risk assessment
requires both negative and positive
information. The credit bureaus
are a treasure trove of system wide
data. Subjected to proper analysis,
such data would enable banks to
obtain a better understanding of
the credit attributes of the various
customer segments, and assist in
identifying risks. Though, negative
information may encourage borrowers
to repay obligations so as to stay
off the “black-list”
and helps banks identify current
defaulters, negative information
alone has less predictive power
than positive and negative information
combined. Decision tools, such as
credit scoring, are difficult to
develop without positive data.
The Credit Information Bureau of
Sri Lanka presently has 82 member
institutions that include all registered
financial institutions. Presently
the coverage is restricted to advances
and credit card facilities over
a certain threshold, but contains
some positive information such as
details of loan repayments. However,
the quality of information is not
the best it could have been due
to reasons such as technical barriers,
practical difficulties in obtaining
certain information from non-member
institutions, such as the legal
system and lack of support and understanding
of benefits by the member firms.
The number of reports requested
from the bureau has increased significantly
and seen constant growth. Today
approximately 2,000 reports are
submitted daily indicating the value
placed on the services of the bureau,
especially from the banking sector.
However, these are almost entirely
applications for credit references
to assess a new borrower. The banks
do not appear to have made use of
the data for other analytical purposes.
The current database only consists
of details of loans above a particular
threshold and strictly limited to
credit granted by the financial
sector. While the database is presently
updated on the monthly basis, there
are instances where member firms
do not report details of all advances
exceeding the stipulated thresholds.
Further, the present database administration
system is designed to capture advances
by purpose / sector, the data submitted
by member institutions often fall
short of this. Preliminary attempts
are underway to include insurance
companies and other utility companies,
expanding the database to include
details of individuals and entities
that are not covered by the members
in financial services. This would
enable banks to strengthen the credit
evaluation process for consumer
lending, which in recent times has
proved to be a growing segment.
Further, the database lacks adequate
data regarding the collateral on
facilities granted, which information
is important in pricing and provisioning.
The system is also not satisfactorily
updated on outcomes of legal proceedings
due to deficiencies that exist in
the present operational setup in
the legal system and lack of automation
and inter-connectivity.
A properly organised credit database
has more use other than making distinctions
between good and bad creditors.
Credit bureau databases provide
a wealth of data to banks to assess
lending risks and for better pricing
and provisioning. These databases
can also be used to work as an early
warning system to lenders in lending
to a particular industry/ sector,
where analysing of records could
highlight industries experiencing
a lull or having declining prospects.
Another
positive outcome of sharing information
is the reduced costs of credit research.
Bureau data facilitates the evaluation
of prospective borrowers, reducing
the need for more costly and intrusive
background and reference checks
especially for the SME sector and
consumer category. Given adequate
availability of data for statistical
analysis, lenders can utilise automated
or semi-automated credit decision
tools, reducing the cost and time
required for processing loan applications.
Use
of bureau information by lending
institutions also comes with benefits
to “good” borrowers.
A system that enables identification
of good borrowers with the aid of
bureau data creates competition
(for instance by tracking debt service
history), will result in cheaper
and easier access to credit. This
in turn works as an incentive for
borrowers to maintain a good credit
profile.
The
IT system of the Credit Information
Bureau of Sri Lanka is expected
to be upgraded to a web-enabled
system, providing on-line data communication
between the bureau and its members.
The system will also ensure that
details of all facilities granted,
immaterial of size, are recorded
in the database of the bureau. This
may also include details of enquiries
in addition to the facilities already
granted. On the other hand, the
members with on-line access could
obtain credit reports instantly,
speeding up loan application screening
process.
The
proposed system will also provide
facilities to analyse data that
would further facilitate risk management.
For example, a member could obtain
exposure to a particular sector,
its default rates, growth rates
etc. In the future, the bureau may
also include insurance, utility
and telecom companies as members,
once the required amendments to
the act are made, which currently
limits members to the financial
sector.
These
developments are encouraging. However,
it would be in the interest of all
banks to re-examine the manner in
which the credit bureau is presently
used. As it stands the services
of the bureau are clearly under
utilised. Given that the bureau
is about to embark on a programme
to upgrade its systems, it would
be a particularly good juncture
for banks and other users to re-look
at their needs and potential needs,
so that the systems eventually put
in place at the bureau reflect the
market needs.