The
common belief or theory is that financial
crises are due to macro-economic factors.
This belief is based on the fact that
the entire banking system depends on the
ability to borrow and lend. This is what
ensures a constant flow of liquidity into
the economy. The borrowing and lending
are not restricted to the consumers or
businesses. Banks also borrow amongst
themselves everyday in order to replenish
their reserves. When a banker can no longer
borrow the money it needs to cover the
money it’s loaned out, a failure
is the result. Contrary to this popular
belief, this paper attempts to discuss
the role of the Management as a major
cause in banking failures. This study
is further based on a recent failure of
a specialized Bank where evidence suggests
that the role of bank management could
be a major cause for failure.
A
bank fails economically when the market
value of its assets declines below the
market value of its liabilities, so that
the market value of its capital (net worth)
becomes negative. At such times, the bank
cannot expect to pay all of its deposits
in full and on time. The perception of
the public of bank failures will be unsatisfactory
because such perceptions may spill over
to other banks and possibly to banking
system as a whole. Banks are therefore
considered more fragile than other institutions
unless properly managed in a transparent
manner. Certain rumours, market information
or perception can change the stability
of a Bank abruptly and depositors may
run “irrationally” on banks.
Poor
management and ineffective supervision
could make good banks bad banks within
a short period. Of these banks which have
gone down could have survived and regained,
stability if Good Management prevailed
while bad Management would lead to deeper
crisis through compounding losses, misuse
of resources and finally fraud. Such banks
could be saved only by addressing the
institutional remedies which have been
proven to be ineffective or even counter
productive. “Nothing serious ever
happens” seems to be the assumption
or the belief of the Management of troubled
banks. In this scenario it is opportune
to analyze, the management problems that
lead to failure.
In
USA bank regulators have a system to rate
banks according to the CAMEL System which
represents the quality of Capital, Assets,
Management, Earnings and Liquidity. Each
institution is given periodically marks
by the regulators according to the performance
in a series of aspects that make up each
of those areas.
These ratings range from 1 to 5 from very
good banks to failing banks. The elements
used as a basis to rate the bank’s
management are;
::
Competence
:: Leadership
:: Compliance with regulations
:: Ability to plan
:: Ability to react to change in environment
:: Quality of policies and ability to
control as they are applied.
:: Quality of the Management team and
potential succession.
:: Risk of insider dealings.
A
satisfactory response to these concepts
can be good definition of Good Management.
If all the banks are well managed, anyone
could argue that there is no need for
regulators to worry much. However, the
fact that Banks are supervised and under
regulatory framework may keep the Management
of Banks on pins to follow the rules of
good management. Traffic lanes and policemen
would be necessary even in a country of
good drivers. Both banking and driving
are risky activities for third parties.
Regulators cannot be expected to check
the activities of the management of a
bank, which is determined to run the place
by hook or by crook. The very existence
of such bank will be a threat sooner or
later. However, Managers of a bank who
are undergoing temporary set backs due
to identified weaknesses will come back
having put the house in order.
Banks
are definitely more fragile than any other
industry because they deal with money
owned by the public. Availability of a
regulatory framework has provided adequate
confidence in the public to trust the
banks to the letter. No questions asked.
Yet failed banks have practically mismanaged
their affairs causing erosion in public
confidence in the banking system as a
whole. A run on a bank depends on the
perception of the depositors and will
have a severe input on the solvency of
other banks.
Banks
which are falling within CAMEL rating
of 3 and below could be considered as
banks with good management. In the case
of rating above 3, management of such
banks have been classified into four categories.
a)
Technical Mismanagement
b)
Cosmetic Management
c)
Desperate Management
d)
Fraudulent Management
These
activities may or may not occur in a sequence
for a bank to fall apart. However, it
appears that Technical mismanagement takes
precedence in the process of the deterioration
of the affairs in a troubled bank. The
significant factor is that management
is innocently ignorant that Technical
mismanagement is taking place within the
reach of their own team. Technical mismanagement
is directly linked to the profitability
of the bank. In an attempt to forcibly
maintain a non existent profitability,
it activates a chain reaction resulting
in cosmetic and desperate management.
The end result will be deliberate FRAUD
carried out by “Good Manager”
who become a “bad Manager”.
Such banks may by this time have lost
its capital with the consequence of severe
a liquidity crisis. Then comes the run
on the banks.
It
has been observed that Technical mismanagement
could occur in the following situations.
When
a new bank is set up and managed by a
new management. On many occasions, bankers
who leave an existing bank to promote
a new bank, try to introduce new methods
of banking which are sometimes not “ethical”.
They would go to the extent of adopting
wrong techniques and criteria in order
to maintain their image and entice the
innocent public to begin relationships.
New banks are always faced with the problem
of gaining public confidence without which
they cannot exist. In their desire to
achieve this overnight, they adopt policies
and practices which are technically outside
accepted management principles.
Seeking
growth for the sake of growth is a fundamental
error committed by troubled banks. Growth
is very often connected with “Over
extension” or lending large sums
of money that are not in proportion to
the Bank’s capital. Similarly such
have diversified in a very short period
to business areas they are not familiar
with or not well equipped to manage well.
Absence of adequate capital to cushion
potential losses become a major constraint
for troubled banks to accommodate write-offs
while maintaining a reasonable growth
of Income generating assets. In the process
of image building management may commit
a major portion of the capital to non-income
generating assets thereby further restricting
the growth. Floating of subsidiaries,
which are not adequately capitalized,
in order to display a“Group”
image to unsuspecting clients will further
add to the already strained capital base.
Lending
policies, which are not consistent and
strong enough to avoid possible losses
due to poor lending, may prove that, in
the long run Management tends to forget
that the funds are owned by the depositors
who expect the bank to keep, manage and
return such deposits, on maturity or on
demand. Inability of the management to
adopt policies to ensure that funds are
lent in a manner so as to yield a proper
remuneration with comfort of recovery
on due dates, will be a poor reflection
on the management of the Bank.
One
good example of poor lending is Risk Concentration.
This means making loans representing a
high proportion of the Bank’s capital
to one single borrower or group or a sector
or industry. Despite regulations and limitations
banks may violate this fundamental rule
to gain quick benefits but inevitable
disaster. Sometimes, due to inadequacy
of competence, Bank Management may be
compelled to surrender to irresistible
pressure from borrowers who sometimes
are unable to service their debt or even
pay their operational overheads. Not all
concentrations lead to failure, but many
bank failures are the result of serious
loan concentrations.
This
is a situation where the bank lends money
to companies or businesses owned by the
bank or major shareholders. This type
of connection compels the Bank Management
to consider requests for poor lending
proposals which are outside the lending
criteria. Connected lending may be done
but within limits. This kind of lending
is risky because management’s lending
to use the bank as an instrument to finance
own businesses irrespective of their ability
to repay. Such concentrations are very
often rolled over to keep them in the
regular portfolio. This type of lending
is common in development banks or specialized
banks. There is nothing wrong in this
type of lending provided effective controls
and proper evaluation criteria are applied
as in the case of lending to third parties.
However,
in practice, such loans are usually made
on less rigorous criteria and highly geared
to small or no equity. In view of the
connection and the necessity to accommodate
this type of lending the attitudes of
the management become lenient in approving
and monitoring of such lending. The key
people who represent the bank in such
businesses will not only go along the
stream of activities desired by the bank
and try to supervise and control for the
mutual benefit of both parties. The parent
bank will hesitate classifying such loans
as non-performing despite evidence of
deterioration.
This
is a situation where lending terms are
out of proportion with those of deposits.
It is an accepted fact that deposits stay
longer with the Bank. But, if and when
terms of lending are over stretched far
beyond those of liabilities or become
un-collectible due to forced roll over
serious liquidity problems may arise causing
mismatch of maturities of Deposits and
Advances. In such a situation, any attempt
to maintain liquidity will result in paying
excessive rates for new funding. If such
deposits are with fixed rates, substantial
losses will occur in the transformation
due to interest rate risk. If the bank
solves its liquidity crisis by offering
rates well above the market disregarding
market valuation, the losses are inevitable.
Continual borrowing at high rates without
correcting mismatches and recovering the
loans has been a major cause for the deterioration
of troubled banks.
Banks
funding faces severe strains due to accumulation
of NPLs resulting in ineffective recovery.
NPLs created through poor lending will
dent the cost structure of the bank compelling
the bank to mobilize more funds to maintain
the holding cost of NPLs and continue
with new lending. NPLs sometimes get stuck
due to conflicts of interest between the
bank and companies owned by the bank.
Many
NPLs are created involving borrowers who
have long relationships with the Bank
on a personal level. They may be well
known to many key officers or sometimes
are in and out of the bank on a day to
day basis. Requests for facilities do
not go through the normal evaluation criteria
but allowed over the counter without any
documentation. Such customers are used
to writing cheques for what ever amount
with confidence because they know very
well that the bank will honour such cheques
whether limits are exceeded or not. This
type of face lending end in a dead lock
situation where the customer suddenly
finds that the party is over for him.
The bank, by having extended unlimited
credit has ruined a customer and is left
with unsecured loans, the recovery of
which is a remote possibility. Now begins
the turn for the banker to go behind the
customer pleading for security cover and
repayment. The cordial relationship that
existed between bank officers and the
customer is no more, causing further strains
on the bank. Banks which fail to assess
all possible risks and resort to name
lending or face lending , face severe
consequences of their folly. But it may
be too late.
Lending
officers who get carried away by the importance
and the long relationship of the customer
and also by other benefits may try to
paint a nice picture to the approving
officers in order to get their proposal
passed. This over optimistic assessment
invariably misses the test good evaluation.
Absence
or inadequacy of internal control could
be disastrous in many areas of operations.
However, shortcomings in the core business
areas which involve income generating
assets are vulnerable and cause more damages
than in other areas.
Absence
of regular credit reviews by credit officers
could reduce the effectiveness of the
monitoring process, due to reliance on
the skills and the ability or competence
of the credit officers in making decisions.
A formal review procedure should be in
place to ensure awareness of the staff
of any adverse trends and through such
trends to draw the attention of the management
for corrective action.
Non-availability
or insufficient feed back is another cause
for deterioration of the assets. A good
information system will help management
to promptly analyze the trends and identify
warning signals well in advance. Lack
of knowledge of what is happening in the
core business area prevents risk management
process in minimizing the losses.
Failure
to ensure that both regulations and internal
policies are properly applied at all levels
will result in gradual failure of controls
to prevent failures. Many failures could
have been avoided, if the internal auditors
were sharp enough to pick evident signals
of impending crisis or if management was
receptive to the reports by the auditors.
A CEO cannot afford to ignore vital areas
unless CEO himself manipulates the internal
operations for obvious reasons.
Ability
to foresee is a very rare gift, which
can be developed with adequate techniques.
But poor planning is not only a matter
of technique but a matter of attitude.
It has a close relationship with the age
or interests of top management, with the
absence of team work, and with the wishful
thinking that banking has always been
a very safe business that needs no sophistication
nor adaptation to change. We have always
done very well, “Nothing serious
ever happens,” “Problems are
solved by time” are typical attitudes.
In a context of economic upheavals, growing
competition, financial “menageries”
etc. it is easy to understand what are
the consequences of poor planning. On
the contrary, if a bank follows its own
trends closely, if it tries to capture
what is ahead in he economy and on the
markets, it can adapt its strategy so
as to suffer limited damage and survive
even in the midst of serious upheavals.
Together with quick growth and bad lending
policies, this aspect of mismanagement
is the most frequent cause for a bank
deterioration.
As
a result of technical mismanagement and/or
other macro or micro factors, a bank may
find itself in a situation where equity
is increasingly eroded by hidden losses,
real profits decrease (if not their disappearance)
and dividends, of course, are in danger.
This would be the typical situation where
good supervision or a good board would
have the bank declare the real situation,
change management and inject new capital.
But lack of proper supervision and/or
good boards lead to a very different situation.
A drop in dividends is the key signal
to the market that the bank is deteriorating
and bankers will tend to do everything
in their power to avoid lack of confidence
and to keep control of ownership and management.
This is the key crossroad. If the banker
does not take the right road, the bank
is doomed to be engulfed in “cosmetic
management” and “desperate
management”, either one after the
other or simultaneously. Management will
get worse and worse, the culture of the
organization will deteriorate very quickly,
the market will be distorted and a spiral
of losses will soar. This is probably
the point of no return. From then on,
liquidation or restructuring is the only
effective solution to a situation of insolvency
that may grow in geometric progression.
What
is called “cosmetic management”
consists of hiding past and current losses
so as to buy time and remain in control,
while looking and/or waiting for solutions.
While
there are almost infinite ways to hide
the economic reality of a bank, some of
the can be grouped in a model; the “upside
down income statement” technique.
In a typical income statement, the first
item is interest income and the last one
is dividends, dividends being the result
of additions and deductions of all the
items in between. But when dividends are
in danger, the banker may decide that
they cannot be considered a variable,
but a fixed element, that is taken as
a basis to construct the remainder of
the statement down the ladder, through
manipulation of figures, no matter what
the reality is. The “upside down
income statement” would therefore
tend to read as model A, as against a
standard one, as shown in model B.
| Model
A |
Model
B |
| Dividends |
| +
Undistributed Profits |
| +
Taxes |
| =
Net Profits |
| +
Provisions |
| ±
Sundry Income/ Expenditure |
| =
Operational Profit |
| +
Overhead |
| -
Fees |
| =
Spread |
| +
Financial Cost |
| =
Interest Income |
|
| Interest/
Income |
| -
Financial Cost |
| =
Spread |
| +
Fees |
| -
Overhead |
| =
Operational Profit |
| ±
Sundry Income/ Expenditure |
| -
Provisions |
| =
Net Profits |
| -
Taxes |
| -
Undistributed Profits |
| =
Dividends |
|
Once
dividends have been predetermined, the
first area a banker will touch upon in
order to maintain the same dividend is
undistributed profits. This is not yet
an accounting gimmick but the threshold
to cosmetics. The bank is sacrificing
its capital adequacy for the sake of a
“good image” that no careful
analyst should believe. Still, investors
will receive the remuneration they were
accustomed to.
The
next problem arises when a further reduction
in undistributed profits is no longer
possible. Then, the banker will think
of manipulating the net profits in order
to increase them on paper, even if that
means having to pay more taxes. How? The
banker will have four main resources to
achieve his purpose.
a)
to make provision less than required,
through “evergreening” procedures,
or collaterialization
b)
to consider un-collectable accruals as
income
c)
to revalue assets
d)
to advance accrual of income and postpone
accrual of expenditures.
The
most serious problems of a bank are not
in loans classified as overdue. They are
smaller loans and are being dealt with.
The worst losses of a bank are hidden
in the portfolio that is classified by
the banker as current portfolio or “good
portfolio”. This means that when
a banker wants to adapt provisions to
a given level of profits and dividends,
he will not classify a bad loan as overdue,
doubtful or a write off. Instead, he will
automatically reschedule the loan over
long periods of time, which will avoid
classifying it as overdue.
Interests
will be refinanced. This is a snowball
process that may lead to disaster because
those loans become more and more difficult
to collect, and the borrower’s bargaining
position is strengthened because of the
bank’s failure to take effective
recovery action. The culture of non-payment
develops. Those practices are very typical
of loans to companies where the bank or
the bankers have stock, or where the bank
has concentrated disproportionate sums
of money. A very significant example of
the latter is that of banks substantially
involved in large lending to one or two
customers, when they keep rescheduling
the debt over and over again without making
the necessary provisions.
Another
typical way of reducing the need for provisions
is to make a bad loan look good by obtaining
collateral, even if that is economically
insufficient to cover the debt or is impossible
to foreclose on. For instance, loans with
prior mortgages, factories with ongoing
business and labour problems, real estate
with limited or no development potential.
However, the banker will account for the
collateral as being worth the principal
and the interest to be accrued over a
period of time. The borrower will again
be very happy about it.
In
any case, the borrowers may still have
negative equity, current losses or even
negative cash flow, but the banker will
argue that he does not need to provide
for those loans, and that time will solve
the stressed situation of the borrowers.
He may even go as far as to say that such
borrowers are going concerns with no need
for provisioning.
The
practices described above not only lead
the banker to make provision less than
he should, but will also lead him to capitalize
interest i.e. to account for refinanced
interest (which in fact will be increased
losses or principal) as income. So, looking
back to the income statement, the banker
has achieved better “profits”
not only because provisions are lower,
but even more important, because interest
income is higher, thanks to procedures
that make loans look like “evergreens”.
Suppose
that “evergreening” is not
enough to keep profits at the desired
level. The banker still has a way out:
to revalue fixed assets, be they real
estate or stock. Some legislation permits
banks to periodically revalue their assets
in times of inflation without additional
tax implications. Some banks use this
advantage to increase the book value of
their assets beyond their economic value,
thus creating artificial additional income
(the difference between the previous book
value and the new one) and reserves (as
a counterpart of the asset revaluation).
Worst
of all, some bankers may revalue their
assets by selling them to companies that
are connected with the bank, on credit
for a price above the book value and account
for the positive differences as income.
The negative difference will not appear
on the buyer’s balance sheet, or,
if it does, it will not be consolidated
with the bank’s balance sheet, as
it should. Another type of “revaluation”;
banks may receive foreclosures that are
insufficient to cover the loan in question
but account for them at the loan value.
Another type of manoeuvre to hide losses
is to advance accrual of income and postpone
accrual of expenditures. Let us mention
a couple of examples. Fees should normally
be spread over the operation term. However,
bankers in trouble will account for them
the very day the fee is received. On the
expenditure side, the banker may postpone
accounting for commitments (for example,
the payment of the price of a purchase)
to the time of actual payment, instead
of making the entry on the day the contract
is signed.
“Desperate
Management” is an expression that
seeks to describe a situation where bankers
see themselves in danger of “having
to declare” a capital loss or having
to pay fewer or no dividends. At that
stage, the banker, besides indulging in
cosmetics, will also look for businesses
which may permit him to buy time, and
if lucky, make up for the previous deterioration.
The main practices followed under these
attitudes are (a) speculation (b) paying
rates above market rates for deposits
and (c) charging high interest rates to
borrowers.
When
a distressed economic environment, bitter
competition, and/ or technical mismanagement
lead you to have current losses and a
high proportion of non-performing assets,
the banker will look for alternative sources
of income, and indulge most of the time,
in speculative activities. A few typical
examples; buying real estate in times
of inflation, in the hope that prices
will keep increasing forever and a profit
will be made when the property is sold;
buying land as a basis for real estate
development through loans from the bank;
buying stock under the assumption that
you are making short term profit. Frequently,
profit does not materialize because of
a change in the market trends or because
of inaccurate estimates. Think of a situation
where a tight monetary policy brings in
deflation and adjustment, the market becomes
narrower and the value of real estate
drops dramatically.
What
happens through the whole process is that
the bank’s proportion of non-performing
assets becomes higher and higher, and
the yield (that is supposed to be the
income to cover deposit, interest rates,
overhead and profits) continues to diminish.
No matter how the cosmetics are applied,
the problem is now the real cash flow,
which suffers damage and the bank begins
to experience liquidity difficulties.
When
in liquidity difficulties, the banker
will go out to the market and offer very
high interest rates to potential depositors.
He needs to maintain an image of growth,
he hopes that he can charge similar high
interest rates to borrowers and have growth
absorb its problems; and above all, he
is just in need of cash. What for? In
order to cover interest to his depositors
and even be able to physically pay the
payroll and other fixed expenditures.
Their deposit principals may no longer
be entirely allocated to making new loans
but to pay staff or suppliers. At this
stage, the banker is taking deposits knowing
they are unlikely to be repaid to depositors.
To
the extent that the banker can still make
new loans with a part of his deposits
increase, he will try to make up for the
high remuneration he pays to the deposits
by charging interest rates to his borrowers
that are beyond the market price. What
happens is that he is now involved in
a perverse process, because the quality
of borrowers that can accept high interest
rates is not likely to be the best. They
are, typically, cases of stressed borrowers
or borrowers connected to the bank or
the bankers, who are not sure they will
have to severe their debt. The borrowers
have small or negative equity. The connected
borrowers have connections. Through this
practice, the banker may have high spreads
on its income statements, but only on
paper.
Fraud
may have been one of the causes of losses
for a bank at an earlier stage. That is
frequently the case when a bank is set
up or acquired by speculators or businessmen
having their own business interests. Also,
fraud is involved in “cosmetic”
management, to the extent it is a way
of hiding the truth to the public, in
a business that is based on confidence.
However, fraud is dealt with at the end
of the process, in order suggest that
a former good manager may become a fraudulent
manager, through a deterioration process,
such as the one described in this paper.
In fact when illiquidity approaches and
the banker feels the end may be near,
he may feel the temptation to divert money
out of the bank. The most typical channel
is self lending, i.e. lending to companies
that are owned by or connected with the
banker. This may be done through special
formal procedures that would make it very
difficult for the bank to foreclose on
him when he is no longer there. Another
fraud that is typical of his last minute
situation is “swinging ownership”
of companies that are partly owned by
the bank and the banker; if the company
is prosperous, the banker may buy it from
the bank at a low price. If the company
is in poor shape, the banker will have
the bank buy it from him at a high price.
After all, he is in charge. Of course,
all those operations are “properly”
materialized through fiduciaries, paper
companies and other similar methods, so
as to escape supervision.
Deterioration
of the management culture is one of the
consequences of keeping problems unsolved
as well as a source of the long lasting
problem. The attitude and the example
of top management permeate middle management
and other organizational layers. A bad
management culture is very difficult to
change. Changing a deteriorated culture
may take a new management at least as
long as it took the culture to deteriorate,
unless, several layers of management,
are changed. This is one of the reasons
why mergers are advocated as a solution
to crises. Some features of a deteriorated
management culture are;
-
Paper is mistaken for facts. Figures
are mistaken for money. Hiding and cheating
becomes normal.
-
Speculators become the ideal kind of
managers, since speculation becomes
the ideal business because it is one
of the few hopes for recovery.
-
Promotion of managers is based on loyalty,
not on competence. Management information
and teamwork disappear gradually.
-
Internal audit activities are cut or
confined to investigation of minor problems
in branch offices.
-
Branch managers become one-legged professionals.
They receive instructions to concentrate
on the collection of deposits and stop
lending, since the whole lending gradually
concentrates in the bank’s headquarters
and main branch office.
-
The fact that money is the raw material
of the bank and the “need for
prestige” lead to inflation in
staff, salaries and over heads. Luxury
premises become a rule.
-
As a counterpart of the culture of non
payment among borrowers of banks in
distress, the banker develops the culture
of non-recovery.
1.
Many of them are expressed or implicit
in the foregoing text, but the risk of
repetition is worth running for the sake
of synthesis. Regulation and supervision
are not panaceas, but they are necessary
pillars to have a strong financial system
and limit the damages caused by mismanagement
and make macro policies effective.
2.
Good Management and supervision may prove
no good if there are no mechanisms in
place to solve insolvency cases. This
situation may even lead to the corruption
of the CEO who, for lack of remedies,
may find himself forced to tolerate hiding.
3.
Bad management is an essential ingredient
of all banking crises. Only in cases of
complete economic upheavel can a good
management be overwhelmed by the context;
but even in this case, there are good
managers and bad managers. Good managers
can limit the damages to a considerable
extent.
4.
The quality of management is dynamic.
Once the bank loses a considerable portion
of its capital without properly reacting
or having new capital injected, an accelerated
process of deterioration is likely to
take place.
5.
The perpetuation of bad management is
likely to multiply losses not only from
the need to finance the previous ones
but also through damage caused by a deteriorating
culture and new loss making activities
or practices.
6.
Capital adequacy requirements are no good,
unless a proper system of assets classification
and provisioning is regulated, enforced
and verified.
7.
Overdue loans on the balance sheet may
be negligible to judge a bank’s
solvency, if compared to big bad loans
that are classified as current The bigger
the bad loan, the more likely it is to
be kept as current.
8.
As a result of the above, rescheduled
and rollover loans are the ideal hidden
place for losses and the ideal way to
have fake capital and income, is by avoiding
provisions and accruing uncollectable
interest as income.
9.
A bank may remain liquid while being in
the process of (losing its capital or
its equity) several times, because of
hiding practices. In other words, when
illiquidity presents itself in a bank,
you are in front of sheer bankruptcy,
which may have eaten up not only own funds
but also a considerable part of the depositors
funds.
10.
Identifying losses and acknowledge them
on the books create problems but work
a miracle, and prompting remedial reactions
from all levels concerned.
11.
This assertion is particularly important
in case of state ownership, where loss
of equity is considered by some to have
a different meaning. In these cases, identification
and disclosure of losses are essential.
The money of the taxpayer is involved
and, through disclosure, not only managers
but also politicians may become more cautious.
12.
Management deterioration and illiquidity
resilience as described above, should
prompt the authorities to react to a bank’s
insolvency as quickly as possible; otherwise,
losses may increase in geometrical progression
and new deposits will be allocated to
bankrupt activities instead of productive
ones. This is not only a danger for each
particular instruction but for the whole
financial system.
13.
High remuneration of deposits, expensive
lending and high spreads on books, are
not necessarily due to relaxation on the
part of the bad banker because of confidence
in bailout operations. On the contrary,
those practices are normally due to the
need to compensate for high overhead,
the wish to hide the bank’s real
situation and, in may cases, the fight
for survival through new deposits that
would cover financial costs and even overheads.
::
World Bank – Working Papers on Policy
Planning & Research
::
Finance fragility by Andrew Sheng
::
IDI Ireland – Seminar on Bank restructuring
::
IDI Seminar on Banking and Development
in 1990s
::
Bank Failure – Stability –
Market Harmonics
::
Bank Failures & Systemic Risk –
George & Kaufman
Mr.
Nimal Hapuarachchy, a career banker holds
a MBA from Post Graduate Institute of
Management and a Diploma in Bank Management
from Institute of Bankers’ Sri Lanka.
He started his career with Bank of Ceylon
and later joined HNB in a senior capacity,
in 1987. At HNB, he held the position
of Head of Domestic Credit and at present
holds the position of Deputy General Manager
(Credit Supervision & Recoveries).
He has received advanced management training
from Ashridge College of Management, U.K.,
Euro Money Management College, U.K. and
the International Development Institution,
Ireland. Mr. Hapuarachchy has wide experience
in Credit and Post Credit Control and
played a major role in restructuring of
Credit Portfolios taken-over from other
Banks.
Mr.
Nimal Hapuarachchy is the Deputy
General Manager (Credit Supervision
& Recoveries),Hatton National
Bank Ltd.
He holds MBA from the Post Graduate
Institute of Management, University
of Sri Jayawardenapura and a
Diploma in Bank Management from
Institute of Bankers –
Sri Lanka. He has received advanced
Management Training from Ashridge
College of Management, U.K.,
Euro Money Management College,
U.K. and the International Development
Institution, Ireland.
Mr.
Hapuarachchy started his career
with Bank of Ceylon and later
joined Hatton National Bank
Ltd, in a senior capacity and
held the position of Head of
Domestic Credit and several
other important positions in
the Bank..
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